Japan–Western Cultural Differences Ver09. “SBTi and BEV Company Cars: How I Resolved the Misalignment Between European HQ and the Japanese Field Teams”

shigenoritanaka3
4月13日
読了時間: 4分

更新日：5 日前

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Apr 13, 2026

Thank you for reading.

This time, I would like to share a story about the confusion that arose around the corporate policy to transition company cars to BEVs.

In early 2024, a sudden notice arrived from our European HQ. The message was simple:

“All company cars must be converted to BEVs. This must be done urgently from an **SBTi standpoint.”

There was no reference to the realities of the Japanese market.

**SBTi (Science Based Targets initiative) is an international framework that enables companies to set greenhouse gas reduction targets based on scientific evidence. The foreign company I worked for joined relatively early, and as a result, BEV transition became a mandatory topic across the entire group.

To be honest, this notice was extremely frustrating. It felt like a one-way directive issued without any understanding of the actual conditions in Japan.

1. European HQ's “Ideology‑Driven” Culture

In European companies, SBTi and BEV transition are not seen as “things we should do,” but rather “things that are naturally expected.”

ESG
Carbon neutrality
Stakeholder capitalism

These concepts sit at the center of management, and the value of “doing the right thing” is deeply rooted. Because of this, HQ seemed to believe they were simply asking for something obvious.

At the same time, this strong ideological orientation often means that imagining the realities of field operations is not their cultural strength.

2. China's “State‑Driven” Model Enables Rapid BEV Adoption

European HQ frequently referenced China.

In China:

Company cars were converted to BEVs in a short period
Charging infrastructure was rapidly deployed
The field had no choice but to comply
Government agencies moved with speed

A state-driven system, where the government sets the direction and companies follow, accelerates BEV adoption.

Because HQ uses this speed as a benchmark, Japan's slower movement appears as a lack of commitment.

3. Japan's “Field‑Driven” Culture Makes BEV Adoption Difficult

In Japan, service cars are not just transportation tools.

They carry tools
Long-distance travel is common
They operate in mountainous and industrial areas
Daily mileage is high
Charging infrastructure is insufficient
Replacement vehicles are not readily available

Given these realities, BEV adoption is often impractical.

I explained to HQ:

“Service quality may decline.”
“Field operations may no longer function.”
“Japan relies heavily on thermal power generation, so BEV adoption may actually increase CO₂ emissions.”
“Japan's high HV penetration has contributed more to global automotive CO₂ reduction than any other region in the world so far.”

However, in a culture where ideology comes first, these field-level realities were difficult to convey.

4. The Peak of Misalignment

European HQ: “Is Japan simply unwilling to comply?”
Japanese field: “We cannot do what is impossible.”

At this point, the disconnect was at its peak.

Europe: Ideology-driven
China: State-driven
Japan: Field-driven

Even though everyone used the same term “BEV transition,” the underlying assumptions were completely different.

5. HQ's Stance Was Clear: “Only BEVs Are Acceptable”

European HQ's premise was extremely clear.

● BEV (Battery Electric Vehicle)

= The only acceptable company car

No engine
Battery + motor only
Zero CO₂ emissions during driving
The most “correct” choice from an SBTi standpoint

● PHEV (Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle)

= “Still an engine car” from HQ's perspective

Engine + motor
EV driving possible, but engine operates on long distances
Most practical for Japan, but not valued by HQ

● HV (Hybrid Vehicle)

= Fully combustion‑engine vehicle

Engine is primary, motor is auxiliary
Most common in Japan
Not considered an EV at all by HQ

The Group's stance was consistent: “Anything with a combustion engine is excluded.” Therefore, BEV was the only option.

Japan understood this logic, but BEVs were operationally unrealistic. Europe believed BEVs were the only correct choice. The premises were fundamentally different, making alignment extremely difficult.

6. The Solution I Proposed

- Personal Lease, 100% Company-Funded

Ultimately, I proposed the following compromise:

“If company-owned vehicles fall under SBTi reporting, then employees can lease vehicles under their personal names, use them 100% for company purposes, and the company can cover 100% of the cost.”

This solution had several implications.

① Satisfies European HQ's ideology

A personally leased vehicle does not need to be a BEV
It falls outside the scope of SBTi reporting
ESG requirements are still satisfied

② Protects the Japanese field

Existing vehicles can continue to be used
Tools can be carried
Long-distance travel remains possible
Service quality is maintained

③ Preserves the Group's “face”

“Not a company asset” satisfies HQ's logic
Japan can maintain operational reality

I explained to HQ:

“If the vehicle is not a company asset, there is no SBTi or shareholder issue. Japan can maintain field operations and service quality. Where is the problem?”

HQ had no objections. In ideology-driven cultures, once the formal structure is satisfied, discussions often conclude.

7. Conclusion

What I realized through this experience is that SBTi and BEV transition are not technical issues. They are political directives that flow one-way from HQ, regardless of local realities.

European HQ was bound by the political requirement of “BEV only.” The Japanese field faced the operational reality that “BEVs cannot support our work.” Neither side was wrong, yet their premises were completely misaligned.